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Abstract: The 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) eroded the consensus around the benefits 
of capital mobility within mainstream economics. Against this background, this paper discusses 
to what extent the new mainstream position on capital flow management measures, based on the 
New Welfare Economics, expands the policy space of developing and emerging economies (DEEs). 
This paper argues that the new position can be classified as an embedded neoliberal one, given 
that it keeps liberalization as its ultimate goal, while nonetheless accepting to mitigate some of its 
harmful consequences. After comparing the capital account policies of China and Brazil, this paper 
concludes that the policy prescriptions of the New Welfare Economics do not lead to higher levels of 
national autonomy for DEEs and are likewise unable to curb financial instability in these countries.
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Introduction
The International Monetary and Financial System (IMFS) evolves around the tension be-
tween the internationalization of economic relations pushed by markets and the pursuit of 
national autonomy by states (Block 1980; Eichengreen 2019; Eichengreen, Mehl and Chitu 
2019; Ocampo 2017; Polanyi 2001). After the Second World War, the Bretton Woods 
* Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre-RS, Brazil; luiza.peruffo@ufrgs.br. ORCID 
iD 0000-0002-5744-4804.
** Central European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary; perfeito_pedro@phd.ceu.edu. ORCID iD 0000-
0002-2469-0996.
*** Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre-RS, Brazil; andre.cunha@ufrgs.br. ORCID 
iD 0000-0002-3746-5974.
174  vol. 43(1) Jan/Apr 2021 Peruffo, Silva & Cunha
System (BWS) leaned to the second pole of this tension, granting space for governments 
to pursue full employment policies and limit the pressure of global financial markets over 
national exchange rates (Davidson 2017; Eichengreen 2019; Skidelsky 2009). That trend 
was reversed during the escalation process that led to the collapse of the BWS, when na-
tional autonomy was increasingly constrained by the internationalization of economic 
relations, notably of global capital (Kirshner 2003; Strange 1998). This process continued 
somewhat uninterrupted until the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) took place, 
which did not represent an inflexion point in favour of states, but instead, created the en-
vironment to limit the freedom of markets in some respects (Baker 2018; Gallagher 2014).
At all times, the developments of economic theory have translated these tensions be-
tween states and markets in the IMFS by way of policy prescriptions. The immediate post-
war period, for instance, marked an inflection in economic theory and practice in terms 
of the role the state should play in the economy, as stirred by the work of John Maynard 
Keynes (1924, 1930). As the balance of power tipped towards markets, however, new eco-
nomic models gave the basis for policies in which the role of states was reduced. This 
is important because, in monetary and financial affairs, mainstream ideas define which 
policies are acceptable, and which ones are not (Kirshner 2003). 
The regulation of cross-border finance is representative of this dynamic among, 
namely, (1) the tensions in the IMFS, (2) the developments in economic theory, and (3) 
the resulting policy prescriptions. Under the cognitive authority of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Moschella 2012), mainstream policy prescriptions on capital con-
trols have changed substantially over time. Capital controls evolved from being widely 
accepted during the BWS to being highly discouraged following its collapse. More recent-
ly, the GFC created the context to change again conventional wisdom on cross-border 
financial policy. Since then, certain capital controls have been reincluded – under the new 
term ‘capital flow management measures’ – as a legitimate component of the macroeco-
nomic policy toolkit as a means to curb financial instability, while financial liberalization 
was maintained as the ultimate policy goal (Chwieroth 2014; Gallagher 2015; IMF 2012; 
Ocampo 2017; Ostry, Ghosh and Korinek 2012). 
In light of this background, this paper investigates to what extent the new mainstream 
position on capital account regulation affects the policy space of developing and emerging 
economies (DEEs). Despite widespread pressure from mainstream economic theory for 
cross-border financial deregulation since the end of the BWS (Fisher 1998: 2, 8), DEEs 
have pursued different approaches on capital controls. While some of them have used 
capital controls as part of a broader development strategy to maintain a competitive ex-
change rate and attract certain types of flows, other DEEs have focused on financial stabil-
ity, attempting to ‘play by the same rules as the core countries,’ as summarized by Jeanne, 
Subramanian and Williamson (2012: 2). Building on Structuralist and Post-Keynesian 
theories, this paper explains the former strategy not only as a consequence of greater pol-
icy space, but also as a cause: the capacity of an economy to implement capital controls 
as part of its development strategy is related to its initial position in centre-periphery 
dynamics and to how it engages with the financial globalization process. 
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This theoretical argument is illustrated with China and Brazil’s capital controls pol-
icies, examples of economies that broadly align with a long-term development strategy 
and with a short-term financial stability approach. Although China’s superior economic 
performance to Brazil’s cannot be solely attributed to contrasting capital controls policies, 
we argue that these countries’ policy options are a symptom of their respective positions 
in the IMFS’ hierarchy. As a matter of fact, China can deviate from standard policies more 
easily than Brazil, because it faces a lower external constraint due to its production struc-
ture and international financial integration profile, which contribute to render China as 
less peripheral than the latter. Brazil, in contrast, features a typical peripheral DEE. Its 
dependence on foreign resources translate into a higher incentive for it to play by main-
stream’s rules, which in turn contributes to reinforce its vulnerable position.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. Firstly, by drawing on the the-
oretical frameworks developed by Cerny (2008), Ban (2016) and Bohle and Greskovits 
(2012, 2019), it explains the new mainstream position on capital controls in light of the 
concept of embedded neoliberalism, which combines the self-regulating market principle 
with the mitigation of some of its harmful social consequences. Such political economy 
regime differs from the embedded liberalism that characterized the BWS and allowed 
countries to restrict economic liberalization as a mean to pursue their domestic objectives 
(Blyth 2002; Helleiner 2019; Ruggie 1982; Sandbrook 2011). Conversely, the new pre-
scription accepts capital controls up until the point where they do not harm the broader 
process of economic liberalization, thus limiting national autonomy, especially for DEEs. 
Secondly, it contributes to the understanding of how DEEs have been dealing with the 
challenges imposed by capital mobility. The contrasting experiences of China and Brazil 
with capital control policies are a case that serves to differentiate DEEs among themselves. 
Whereas state power has been in general diminished by market power, it seems that some 
states have been more successful in preserving their national autonomy than others.1
This paper is divided in six sections. Following this introduction, the second section 
reviews the dynamics among states and markets in the IMFS, focusing on how the result 
of these dynamics resulted in different policy prescriptions on capital controls throughout 
time. The third section builds on Structuralist and post-Keynesian theories to discuss the 
role of capital controls for the national autonomy of DEEs. The fourth section presents the 
experiences of China and Brazil with capital control policies. The fifth section compares 
the two cases, outlining the analytical implications of these two countries for other DEEs. 
The sixth section concludes the paper, suggesting that the policy prescriptions of the New 
Welfare Economics do not lead to higher levels of national autonomy for DEEs and are 
likewise unable to curb financial instability in these countries.
Institutional Change Theory and capital account regulation: from the 
gold standard to the Global Financial Crisis
According to Polanyi (2001), the capitalist economy is characterized by the tension be-
tween the self-regulating market principle and the social need for embeddedness. In this 
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approach, the expansion of the self-regulating market principle leads to deep social dislo-
cations, motivating the mobilization of different social segments (Sandbrook 2011). Such 
reactions forge what Polanyi (2001) defines as the double movement: the use of the state 
to protect society from the expansion of the market realm and its negative effects. The 
generalization of the Polanyian double movement, put forward by Blyth (2002), leads to 
a theory of institutional change in which the political and economic institutions develop 
following a pendular movement, determined by the permanent conflict between the social 
segments that demand the regulation of the market and those that are impaired by such 
intervention. 
In this perspective, the expansion of the self-regulating market mobilizes the dislo-
cated social segments around alternative ideas, demanding countervailing economic and 
social policies. In periods of economic crisis, such counter-movements are able to imple-
ment these ideas, fostering institutional changes that increase the degree of economic in-
terventionism. The same process occurs when the state’s regulation expands over markets. 
As markets are impaired by interventionism, market actors also conceive ideas to promote 
liberalizing institutional changes, taking advantage from periods of economic instability 
to implement them.
This theory of institutional change is useful to understand the evolution of capital con-
trol policies over time. In a nutshell, capital controls help to loosen the linkages between 
the policies designed to meet domestic objectives (such as income and employment) and 
the effect these policies might have in terms of the economy’s external equilibrium (re-
flected in its balance of payments and in its international investment position). To that 
extent, capital controls can be regarded as part of the macroeconomic toolkit that allows 
the state to minimize the negative effects of free markets over society. In the specific case 
of capital markets, these negative effects are mostly associated with financial crises as well 
as with an excessive volatility of important macroeconomic prices, such as the exchange 
and interest rates. The acceptance of the use of capital controls as a legitimate policy tool, 
however, has fluctuated throughout history, along with Polanyi’s pendulum.
In theory, an economy that wants to keep its monetary autonomy needs to give up 
either its exchange rate stability or restrain its capital mobility – what is known as the ‘im-
possible trinity’ or Mundell-Fleming trilemma. Nevertheless, certain rules of the interna-
tional system are set by global powers, whose preferences spill over to the rest of the world. 
Anchored on free trade and capital movement at the expense of monetary autonomy, the 
Gold Standard was the touchstone of the British economic hegemony in the nineteenth 
century (Eichengreen 2019, Chapter 2; Levitt 2006: 168; Ruggie 1982). During the Gold 
Standard, imposing capital controls to limit the expansion of the haute finance would cost 
countries the exclusion from Britain’s trade and financial relations, which was hardly in 
the interest of domestic elites worldwide, who in general opted to be part of the global ar-
rangement. Subsequently, the transition from the British to the American hegemony gave 
rise to a new set of interests, moving Polanyi’s pendulum away from the self-regulating 
market towards a greater role for the state, which was embodied in the BWS (Eichengreen 
2019, Chapter 4). Then, American objectives of locking a coalition with Western Europe 
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and restoring global trade could only be achieved if governments worldwide were able 
to pursue full employment policies (Block 1980). As a result, the BWS was based on the 
principle of embedded liberalism, whereby states could limit capital movement in order to 
pursue domestic objectives (Blyth 2002; Eichengreen 2019; Helleiner 2019; Ruggie 1982; 
Sandbrook 2011). Similar to Britain’s hegemony, the access to America’s trade and finan-
cial networks was conditional to joining the BWS, an option that was followed by most 
policymakers across the globe. 
To that extent, capital mobility can be regarded as a structural feature of the interna-
tional system (Eichengreen 2019). As put forward by Andrews (1994: 202), ‘the degree 
of [capital] mobility systematically alters state calculations and behaviour […] [it is] a 
constraining condition which rewards certain behaviours and punishes others.’ Put differ-
ently, the use of capital control policies has been both rewarded and punished, depending 
on how the tension between states and markets was translated into policy prescriptions at 
different times. 
Since the establishment of the BWS, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been 
the guardian of policies that govern capital mobility (Moschella 2012). At its origins, its 
recommendations echoed the then conventional wisdom founded on Keynesian econom-
ics (Davidson 2017; Minsky 1993), prescribing capital controls as a way to contain an 
inherently unstable financial system. However, the particular environment that was at the 
origins of the BWS gradually faded away and the global economic order witnessed the 
emergence of neoliberalism (Helleiner 1995; Kirshner 2003; Levitt 2006; Strange 1998). 
Then, the IMF adjusted its policy prescriptions on capital controls accordingly (see for 
example Fisher 1998), eventually replacing exchange rate stability by capital account lib-
eralization as the main conditionality to offer financial assistance to DEEs facing macro-
economic difficulties (Chwieroth 2010; Moschella 2012). This went exactly in the opposite 
direction of the IMF’s original mandate. 
The IMF’s ‘new’ institutional view on capital controls put forth in the aftermath of the 
GFC serves to illustrate the IMF’s role in expressing the tension between the self-regulat-
ing market principle and the social need for embeddedness. The severe effect of the GFC 
on centre economies created a new set of class-based interests and international alliances 
that contrasted with the previous equilibrium.2 If in the 1990s the IMF explained the fi-
nancial crises in DEEs by blaming these countries’ domestic institutional flaws and urging 
them to remove capital controls (Fisher 1998: 3; Prasad et al 2003: 6), it changed its view 
when developed countries became the epicentre of the crisis (Baker 2018; Helleiner 2010). 
The GFC weakened the Neoclassical argument that the effects of capital mobility were a 
function of the institutions adopted by each country, not least because now it was harming 
the global (financial) elite, which pressured for tighter regulation. 
The post-GFC has put a halt to Polanyi’s pendulum swing towards freer markets. 
This process has been consubstantiated in the emergence of the New Welfare Economics 
(NWE) and corresponding policy prescriptions. The NWE was built upon neoclassical as-
sumptions and, to that extent, it does not represent a movement away from the self-regu-
lating market principle. If anything, the NWE serves to limit free market expansion before 
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it forges a reaction towards a greater role for the state. The NWE approach acknowledges 
the existence of market failures in free markets and argues these risks can be mitigated 
by regulation and institutional design (Korinek 2018; Ostry, Ghosh and Korinek 2012; 
Stiglitz 2019; Tobin 2000). 
The conciliation between the globalization project and a partial reform of the IMFS 
can be explained as a case of embedded neoliberalism. According to Ban (2016), Cerny 
(2008) and Bohle and Greskovits (2012, 2019), embedded neoliberalism conforms with 
the self-regulating market principle while recognizing that free markets lead to massive 
social dislocation and disruptive socio-political conflicts. The adoption of the NWE ap-
proach implies keeping economic liberalization as a long-run objective, while slowing 
down its pace and/or mitigating some of its harmful consequences (Korinek 2018; Ostry, 
Ghosh and Korinek 2012; Ghosh, Ostry and Qureshi 2018). 
The NWE’s embedded neoliberalism is reflected in the IMF’s new institutional posi-
tion, which now admits the use of certain capital controls as part of the legitimate policy 
toolkit (IMF 2011, 2012, 2016). Still, the IMF advises that capital controls should be ad-
opted only as a last resort, keeping financial integration and capital account liberalization 
as an ultimate policy goal. According to Chwieroth (2014), the IMF’s new institutional 
position offered a compromise solution, cementing a reformist coalition that generated 
partial gains for heterogeneous agents. One the one hand, DEEs’ bureaucracies and world-
wide exporters gained a legitimate path to regulate capital flows and prevent exchange 
rate overvaluation. Accepting these marginal advances came at the opportunity cost of 
using the post-GFC context to foster a deeper global monetary governance reform. On the 
other hand, advocates of neoliberal free market principles, such as financial institutions, 
independent central bankers and the IMF staff in general, accepted the rebirth of capital 
controls as a legitimate policy, as they gained the opportunity to frame the new regulations 
at the convenience of the globalization project.3
Explaining the new mainstream position on capital account regulation as embedded 
neoliberal is useful to understand why it does not contribute to change the fundamental 
peripheral condition of DEEs in the IMFS. As the next section will discuss, DEEs face 
certain predicaments in the IMFS that are simultaneously both a cause, as well as a conse-
quence, of their peripheral position in the global system.
The role of capital controls to DEEs’ national autonomy
The notion of ‘national autonomy’ is invoked by political scientists and economists alike 
to refer to ‘the ability of a nation-state as a collectivity to make decisions which shape its 
political and economic future,’ as summarized by Peter B. Evans (1971: 676). Back in the 
1950s and the 1960s, Structuralist scholars warned that this ability could be curtailed by 
the way states are integrated into the global system. According to these traditions, the 
world is divided between a dominant, autonomous core and a dependent periphery due 
to fundamental economic and political domestic characteristics. This divide explains the 
role each economy plays in global production structures that simultaneously link and 
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reinforce the ‘North’ and ‘South’ division (Prebisch 1949; Furtado 1974). Since the 1970s, 
International Political Economy (IPE) researchers have also argued that national autono-
my was increasingly threatened by the power of markets and free capital (See, for exam-
ple, Andrews 1994 and Strange 1998). The globalization phenomenon, as put forward by 
Kirshner (2009: 41), ‘affects state capacity and autonomy, and thus reshapes the relative 
power of the state vis-à-vis non-state actors, social forces and market pressures,’ besides 
reshuffling the ‘relative distribution of capabilities and vulnerabilities between states’ (See 
also Levitt 2006: 168-175). This section brings together centre-periphery and state versus 
markets structural dimensions to explain the role of capital controls in the DEEs’ national 
autonomy.
Founded on the ideational underpinnings of neoliberalism, the period that went from 
the post-Bretton Woods until the GFC was marked by an incessant pressure from de-
veloped countries, led by the United States, for DEEs to liberalize their capital accounts 
(Ocampo 2017: 110). According to the conventional wisdom at the time, capital account 
liberalization should be pursued not only because it was ‘an inevitable step on the path 
of development,’ as the then First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF Stanley Fischer 
(1998: 2) reasoned. It should also be pursued given the potential benefits of liberaliza-
tion in terms of economic growth and welfare outweighing its costs. In fact, under this 
perspective, financial liberalization costs would be mostly associated with the poor mac-
roeconomic management of countries, their fragile banking systems and with domestic 
political instability (Fischer 1998: 3; Prasad et al 2003: 8). If governments behaved well, 
markets would reward their good policies in a virtuous cycle of economic growth and 
development. If governments misbehaved, markets would discipline them, which would 
also contribute to development eventually. Either way, it was up to countries individ-
ually to reap the benefits of capital account liberalization, framed as a natural stage of 
development.
The DEEs reaction to such pressure varied widely, which can be explained by taking 
into account both structural factors of the IMFS underlying hierarchy and political econ-
omy elements specific to each country. On the one hand, DEEs that were more dependent 
on foreign capital were less able to resist the adoption of the ‘best (neoliberal) practic-
es’ advocated by developed, creditor states (Armijo and Katada 2014: 49). On the other, 
DEEs integration to the globalization process was also explained by the preferences of 
their domestic elites and subjacent economic motives.4 The financialization process that 
accompanied the rise of globalization and neoliberalism was reflected in greater financial 
elites power worldwide (Epstein 2005). For weaker peripherical states, however, it was 
easier to shape policies to their benefit, even if those neoliberal, free market policies came 
at the expense of a lower wellbeing of the domestic collectivity (Levitt 2006: 173-174). By 
this token, the starting point of DEEs in centre-periphery dynamics, and of their domestic 
political economy, matters in that it provides an understanding of why some DEEs have 
managed to remain more autonomous than others since the world economy has grown 
closer. 
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DEEs that gave in to the pressure emanated from neoliberal theory, developed coun-
tries and their own financial elites soon felt the destabilizing effects of free capital markets 
over their liberalized capital accounts. The financial crises that would follow in the late 
1990s triggered a reaction of Latin American and East Asian DEEs that was characterized 
by the creation of mechanisms of monetary and financial cooperation designed to reduce 
their dependence on multilateral institutions, dominated by developed countries, their 
rules and their currencies (Armijo and Katada 2014: 54-55). Individually, DEEs adopted 
international reserve accumulation strategies as a basic defence structure against an un-
stable IMFS, a strategy that was not only very costly but also inconsistent with mainstream 
economic theory on open macroeconomics, according to which flexible exchange rates 
should not require (massive) reserve accumulation.
While the explanation for the stockpiles of international reserves accumulated by 
DEEs since the early 2000s can be associated with mercantilist and self-insurance mo-
tives, there is also a link thereof with the practical impossibility of these countries to adopt 
capital controls as a legitimate economic policy tool under the neoliberalism paradigm. 
As Kirshner (2003: 12) masterly grasped, ‘with regard to money, the power of ideas does 
more than just shape the possible. It defines the feasible’ (also see Andrews 1994). As dis-
cussed in section 2, giving up free capital mobility is not entirely under governmental con-
trol inasmuch as it can be regarded as a structural feature of the IMFS (Andrews 1994; Rey 
2015).5 In any case, theoretically, the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime would 
still enable monetary policy independence in a financially integrated world. The issue for 
DEEs is that their currencies and the assets denominated in their currencies occupy the 
position of risky assets in financial markets portfolios, which is reflected in a procycli-
cal and volatile demand that is transmitted to exchange rate movements (Andrade and 
Prates 2013; Kaltenbrunner 2018; Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015, 2018; Paula, Fritz 
and Prates 2017; Prates and Paula 2017; for an IPE perspective on the currency hierarchy, 
see Cohen 2015, 2018). In this context, the accumulation of international reserves serves 
to limit the exchange rate flexibility, either through direct intervention of the monetary 
authority or simply due to a gigantic volume of international reserves boosts creditors’ 
confidence on the DEEs’ economic health. As put forward by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2017: 7), ‘to some extent, reserves have replaced capital controls.’ In order to be certain, 
under capital market liberalization, the accumulation of international reserves can be seen 
as a way to circumvent the marginal place occupied by DEEs’ currencies and assets in 
global financial dynamics and to preserve some of their monetary policy independence, 
which can be regarded as an important aspect of a country’s national autonomy. 
Therefore, international reserve accumulation can be linked to the DEEs’ intrinsic 
lower level of national autonomy in an IMFS where national currencies perform the role 
of international currencies. As there is not a truly international currency – as the bancor, 
proposed by Keynes –, domestic currencies compete among themselves to fulfill the func-
tions of medium of exchange, unit of account and reserve of value at the international level 
(Cohen 2015: 8-10). The capacity of currencies to stand out in this international com-
petition is intrinsically related with the political and economic power of its issuing state 
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(Cohen 2015: 10-15). It is possible to say that centre-periphery dynamics are transmitted 
to the monetary domain, in which currencies issued by developed countries will be placed 
higher in the monetary hierarchy than those issued by DEEs (Ocampo 2001; Paula, Fritz 
and Prates 2017; Prates and Paula 2017). 
The post-Bretton Woods IMFS – characterized by the fiduciary dollar standard, float-
ing exchange rates and almost free capital mobility, has increased the dollar dominance 
and exacerbated the negative consequences of the monetary hierarchy for DEEs (Fritz 
and Prates 2018; Gallagher et al 2014; Ocampo 2017; Paula, Fritz and Prates 2017). If on 
the one hand the United States enjoys an enormous macroeconomic flexibility – the so-
called exorbitant privilege –, delaying and deflecting the cost of its domestic and external 
adjustment onto the rest of the world (Cohen 2015: 22), on the other, DEEs are ‘expected 
to behave in ways that generate ‘credibility’ to financial markets, which means that they are 
expected to adopt pro-cyclical (austerity) policies during crisis,’ as remarked by Ocampo 
(2001: 11). 
The existence of a high level of international reserves inspires confidence in financial 
markets because creditors know they will have access to hard currency when they de-
cide to move their investments elsewhere. This dynamic between the ability of the United 
States to offer the safest and most liquid assets of the IMFS and the huge demand of DEEs 
for those assets as a way to preserve some of their national autonomy for monetary poli-
cymaking is, by and large, rooted in the use of national currencies beyond their monetary 
domain (Cohen 2018: 27; Gourinchas, Rey and Sauzet 2019; Vermeiren and Dierckx 2012: 
1658-1659). 
All in all, in a context where capital flows can easily punish or reward governments 
for policy decisions (Andrews 1994; Kirshner 2003), DEEs are compromised between opt-
ing for opening up their capital account to attract the much needed foreign capital and 
regulating cross-border flows to create certain policy space. The use of capital controls 
does not denote that a country will ‘cut itself off from the international capital markets,’ as 
Fisher (1998: 10) once claimed by putting forth a competing argument for capital account 
liberalization. Instead, capital controls policies serve to circumvent the negative conse-
quences of the monetary hierarchy under free capital mobility, partially delinking ‘the 
effects of capital flows on interest and exchange rates and, therefore, reducing the trade-
off that authorities face between monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability,’ 
as noted by Ocampo (2017: 132). To that extent, these policies simultaneously attenuate 
external financial instability and increase the policy space for counter-cyclical macroeco-
nomic policies, including long term policies for economic development (Ocampo 2017: 
128; on how national monetary policies are constrained by the global financial cycle, see 
also Gourinchas, Rey and Sauzet 2019; Obstfeld 2015; Rey 2015). 
While capital controls can reduce financial volatility and create policy space at the the-
oretical level, the use of such policy space to implement a long-term development strategy 
in practice is a more complicated matter. The same policy instrument can be deployed for 
different reasons. Simply implementing capital control policies does not signify that the 
government is using them as a means to create policy space; it might simply be managing a 
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circumstantial financial instability problem. Using capital controls as a development strat-
egy means that they are being calibrated alongside a broader macroeconomic toolkit to 
reach development goals – including (but not limited to) industrial, credit, education, and 
social policies. Identifying the consistency of capital controls as development policies is 
not a straightforward task, but a closer look into the cases of China and Brazil serves to 
contrast how different approaches to capital controls can, over the long run, contribute to 
different levels of national autonomy.
China and Brazil: two tales of capital controls
By delving into the cases of China and Brazil, this section argues that the DEEs capacity 
to use capital controls as part of a broader development strategy depends not only on 
their initial position in the centre-periphery dynamics, but also on how their governments 
choose to engage with the financial globalization process. China and Brazil are examples 
of how international and domestic dimensions can interact to engender higher or lower 
levels of national autonomy, respectively, in a dollar-centred system with nearly free cap-
ital mobility.
From shield to sword: financial statecraft in China6
China’s integration with the global economy began with market-oriented reforms inau-
gurated in 1978 but remained weak until the early 1990s. Capital flows were minimal 
due to strict capital controls and due to China’s low appeal for international investors as a 
socialist economy with limited exposure to global trade (Prasad and Wei 2007: 421). Asian 
economies represented the largest share of China’s inflows, which was constituted mainly 
by foreign direct investment (FDI) – a type of flow that tends to be more stable and associ-
ated with other benefits, such as technological transfers (Prasad et al 2003: 10; Prasad and 
Wei 2007: 429; Prasad 2016, chapter 3). While China’s external debt rose from 3% of the 
GDP in 1982 to 14% of the GDP in 1990, it remained significantly below DEEs’ average, 
with little sovereign borrowing and private companies being discouraged from taking on 
external debt. China’s external debt remained stable, accounting for around 15% of the 
GDP between 1990 and 1998, whereas external debt averaged 50% of the GDP in Latin 
America and just above that in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Philippines 
and Indonesia, whereas India’s external debt accounted for some 25% of its GDP (Prasad 
and Wei 2007: 433-435). In parallel, the government started to conduct a slow process of 
opening its financial system in the early 1980s, allowing a few foreign banks and insurance 
companies to undertake business in certain cities, and committed to a greater liberaliza-
tion of its financial services to foreign participants as it became a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 (Helleiner and Wang 2019: 224; Yongding 
2009: 2-6). Yet, as of 2020, China’s financial system is largely closed to foreign banks. In 
2016, the participation of foreign banks accounted for only 1.2% of the total banking as-
sets in China (Helleiner and Wang 2019: 224). 
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While a gradual capital account liberalization began to take place in 1994, China 
escaped from the financial turbulences that affected financially integrated DEEs in the 
late 1990s (Gallagher et al 2014: 2-3; Yongding 2009: 1). Thereafter, China removed most 
restrictions for FDI inflows and relaxed controls over portfolio investments, albeit main-
taining quota schemes as well as controlling money market transactions and financial 
derivatives (Gallagher et al 2014: 3). The fact that China’s net capital inflows were large 
in magnitude yet small in relation to the size of its economy (Prasad and Wei 2007: 425) 
meant that swings in the ‘international market sentiment’ caused limited domestic distur-
bances. China was also quite detached from Western pressure, since by 2003, the United 
States and the European Union economies together accounted for only 15% of China’s FDI 
inflows (Prasad and Wei 2007: 429). In moments of higher uncertainty, such as during 
the Asian crisis in 1997-98 and of economic slowdown in advanced economies, such as 
the period following the dot-com crisis in 2001, FDI flows to China remained essentially 
unchanged, despite having decreased in most DEEs (Prasad and Wei 2007: 425).
Chinese policies of leaving the financial issue under state control and preventing in-
ternational banks from penetrating the domestic system serve to demonstrate China’s fi-
nancial nationalism (Helleiner and Wang 2019; Prasad 2016, Chapter 1; Vermeiren and 
Dierckx 2012). Overall, Chinese regulations of capital inflows and outflows have been 
subordinated to a broader project to direct credit toward strategic development goals 
(Gallagher et al 2014: 2), rather than being a concession to Western advanced economies 
(Vermeiren and Dierckx 2012: 1651). China’s development project has been connected 
with a nationalist desire of resisting to American financial hegemony, which encompassed 
securing its monetary sovereignty and independence from foreign financial institutions 
(Helleiner and Wang: 225). Cultivating the renminbi (RMB) as an alternative to the US 
dollar was a natural corollary to these ambitions (Cohen 2014, 2018; Vermeiren and 
Dierckx 2012: 1659-1660). 
Gradually, and more explicitly, since the GFC, China replaced its inward and defen-
sive financial nationalism to an outward orientation in which the RMB internationaliza-
tion plays a key role (Helleiner and Wang 2019: 225). In July 2005, China announced the 
move away from a fixed exchange rate against the US dollar to a more flexible arrangement 
(Yongding 2009: 28-29). From July 2005 to July 2015, the RMB’s real effective exchange 
rate appreciated by 58% (44% nominal), while the appreciation against the dollar was 26% 
(Das 2019: 8). That was accompanied by policies that partially liberalized China’s foreign 
exchange markets, such as the establishment of markets for currency forwards and swaps, 
and the expansion of market participants (Das 2019: 7).
As China increases its global ambitions, it faces a trade-off between internationalizing 
the RMB and cautiously opening its capital account (Prasad 2016, Chapter 6; Vermeiren 
and Dierckx 2012: 1660-1661). The appeal to frame the RMB as an international curren-
cy requires a certain financial liberalization in China so that foreigners can buy and sell 
at will, in addition to having the right to issue debt and equities denominated in RMBs 
(Cohen 2014: 48-49). In 2010, an offshore RMB market was established in Hong Kong 
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SAR that was soon replicated in other countries (Das 2019: 15; Vermeiren and Dierckx 
2012: 1660). 
In addition, before having the RMB included in the IMF’s Special Drawing Right 
(SDR) basket, China undertook a number of financial market liberalization measures, 
loosening interest rate controls and opening its domestic bond market to foreign central 
banks and sovereign wealth funds (Das 2019: 15). China’s integration into global financial 
markets was shortly reflected in greater foreign exchange pressures against the RMB. For 
instance, an announcement made in August 2015 that the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) 
would increase RMB flexibility triggered a surge in global financial market volatility and 
outflows from China as market participants anticipated the depreciation of the RMB. 
China responded with strong foreign exchange intervention (selling US$ 321 billions of 
reserves in the second half of 2015) and capital controls enforcement to limit outflows 
(Das 2019: 10-11). In any case, as China engaged deeper with the globalization order, it 
soon began to feel the destabilizing effects of free capital markets, effects which have long 
been known by DEEs like Brazil.
Brazil’s old and new external vulnerabilities7
External constraints have historically played a major role in defining domestic economic 
policies in Brazil. For Brazil, the US ascent as the global monetary power was ambivalent. 
On the one hand, adjusting Brazilian economic policies to follow Washington’s prescrip-
tions meant that Brazil could benefit from the United States’ direct aid and indirect sup-
port through the Bretton Woods Institutions. In addition, maintaining a good relationship 
with the United States in general also worked as a quality stamp to attract the much need-
ed international private capital. Conversely, these policies often came at the cost of subor-
dinating domestic objectives to external ones. From deciding on its exchange rate regime 
to appointing economic officials that pleased US authorities, Brazilian governments have 
explicitly and implicitly weighted the pros and cons of challenging the United States’ pref-
erences concerning its chosen domestic policy decisions (see for example Armijo 1993: 
264; Loureiro 2014). The tensions from Brazil’s asymmetrical relationship with the United 
States have been transmitted to Brazilian domestic politics, in which opposing political 
groups perceive the alignment with the US as an advantage or as a disadvantage to over-
come underdevelopment. To that extent, Brazil’s domestic debate on economic develop-
ment and national autonomy has been fundamentally associated with Brazil’s position in 
the IMFS’ hierarchy.
In contrast with China’s financial closeness, the Brazilian government enthusiastically 
engaged with the expansion of international financial markets in the late 1960s (Goldfajn 
and Minella 2007: 361-362). The upsurge in the international credit supply prompted by 
US expansionary policies at the time allowed countries like Brazil, which previously had 
no regular access to financial markets, to become large-scale borrowers (Batista 1987: 11). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil’s capital account convertibility enabled the authorization of 
profit remittances to FDI, loans and other forms of finance. The expansion of the external 
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debt during the 1970s was contained by the reversal of market conditions at the end of that 
decade, as the Mexican moratorium interrupted voluntary capital flows to Brazil, trigger-
ing an external debt crisis in 1982 – a problem settled only in 1994 with the issuance of 
the Brady bonds (Goldfajn and Minella 2007: 353-357). During this period, the external 
problem mainly took over the domestic agenda: Brazil tightened its monetary and fiscal 
policies and followed the guidance set by the IMF for most of the time, with the intent to 
generate enough hard currency to pay its external obligations.
The 1990s were a turning point for Brazil’s engagement with the globalization or-
der and its neoliberal policy prescriptions (Goldfajn and Minella 2007: 370; Souza and 
Carvalho 2011). Following an initial opening in the late-1980s, when Brazil started to 
liberalize capital inflows, in the 1990s, the government committed with capital account 
openness, liberalizing capital outflows, removing restrictions over FDI, and allowing for-
eign institutional investors to acquire derivatives and domestic firms’ equities (Goldfajn 
and Minella 2007: 372). In parallel, Brazil’ financial system went through a deep process 
of restructuring, which began in the aftermath of its currency stabilization program in 
1994, the Real Plan. The system in place until 1994 had a strong presence of public banks, 
a restricted number of foreign banks, a major role for directed credit, narrow competition, 
and a substantial reliance of banks’ profits on revenues correlated with high inflation. The 
financial system that emerged in the new low inflation environment had a much larger 
presence of foreign banks and a reduced share of public banks, a combination that resulted 
in a freer allocation of credit. All in all, Brazil became much more open financially by the 
late 1990s. This partially explains why the Brazilian Central Bank was unable to contain 
the speculative attack against the Brazilian currency in January 1999, which precipitated a 
fundamental change in Brazil’s macroeconomic policy framework, that of changing from 
a fixed to a floating exchange rate regime.
From then on, subsequent Brazilian governments put in place several policies to in-
crease the resilience of the Brazilian economy against financial instability which, nonethe-
less, by ignoring Brazil’s place as a peripheral country in the IMFS, ended up replacing old 
vulnerabilities for new external ones (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2015, 2018). However, 
since the international economy entered into a buoyant phase in the early 2000s, with 
rising commodity prices (fuelled by China’s global integration) and high international 
liquidity, these new external vulnerabilities would not be clearly exposed until 2011, when 
the commodity bonanza period had ended. Brazilian authorities seized the prosperous 
period to build up international reserves and to reduce the dollar-denominated debt, in-
cluding by paying off Brazil’s debt with the IMF two years ahead of schedule. While deal-
ing with the traditional constraints of foreign currency shortages and of high levels of 
public indebtedness in foreign currency, Brazilian governments lowered controls for for-
eign participants to operate in Brazil (Prates and Paula 2017; Souza and Carvalho 2011). 
Gradually, foreign participants accounted for a large share of domestic assets, rendering 
Brazil’s external vulnerability increasingly denominated in domestic currency. The greater 
participation of foreign players has been transmitted to higher foreign exchange market 
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pressures, reducing the capacity of Brazilian policymakers to pursue domestic objectives 
without subordinating them to the external balance.
DEEs’ national autonomy in light of China’s and Brazil’s capital control 
policies
The contrasting experiences of China and Brazil with international financial integration 
and capital control policies serve to shed light on the more general case of DEEs’ national 
autonomy in a world of increasing capital mobility. As a matter of fact, while there is a 
structural component in international monetary and financial relations that compromises 
DEEs’ national autonomy, DEEs have some degree of agency in determining the profile of 
their integration into global financial markets. Focusing the comparative analysis on the 
1990s onwards, China has maintained a high level of capital controls, while Brazil started 
off from an already lower level to decrease even further in the early 2000s up to the GFC 
(see Figure 1 below).














































Source: Created by the authors based on Fernandez et al (2016)
Note: This reformulated version of the CCI took into consideration the average level of capital controls over 
four types of flows: direct investments, portfolio investments, other investments, and derivatives.
In addition to different levels of capital controls, China and Brazil have also diverged 
with regard to the type of the regulatory instruments they employ to restrict capital mo-
bility. For one, Brazil has removed most of administrative controls, narrowing down the 
restrictions to cyclically adjusted tax-based regulations over more volatile transactions 
such as portfolio flows, debt and derivatives (Fritz and Prates 2018). As these controls 
target short-term flows, Alami (2019) and Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2018) argue 
that Brazilian authorities have mostly aimed to safeguard financial stability rather than 
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restricting capital mobility. China, in turn, despite having gradually loosened capital con-
trols, has kept a variety of regulatory instruments, including taxes, quota schemes and 
administrative prohibitions (Gallagher et al 2014; Prasad and Wei 2007). While intention 
is very hard to establish, the articulation between the different regulations can be seen as a 
subordination of capital mobility to China’s national development strategy (Helleiner and 
Wang 2019), which contrasts with Brazil’s arguable focus on financial stability.
Notwithstanding the differences between Chinese and Brazilian approaches to capital 
controls, both countries have increased their financial integration from 1991 to 2015 (see 
Figure 2 below), evoking the structural feature of capital mobility in the IMFS. Under 
the surface of this apparent convergence, however, China and Brazil developed different 
relationships with financial globalization, which can be at least in part traced back to their 
capital controls policies. Brazilian foreign liabilities, for instance, are composed mostly 
by portfolio and debt flows, whereas Chinese foreign liabilities constitute mostly direct 
investments (see Figure 3 below). One may argue that this means Brazil is more exposed 
to short-term changes in the global financial cycle than China – a DEE that enjoys a longer 
commitment by foreign capital. 





























Source: Created by the authors based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018).
Note: The FII is calculated through the sum of foreign assets and liabilities, divided by the GDP.
China and Brazil opposite distributions between foreign assets and liabilities (see 
Figure 4 below) serve to illustrate how the capacity of a country to employ capital controls 
as part of a broader development strategy can be seen not only as a consequence of great-
er policy space, but also as a cause thereof. From a Structuralist perspective, the broad 
‘North’ and ‘South’ division may be considered as a creditor and debtor division. At first, 
both China and Brazil were dependent on foreign capital. Due to a set of factors, including 
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(but not limited to) political economy domestic issues, Brazil ‘played by the rules’ and 
accepted an integration led by liabilities (from the late 1960s on), while China remained 
largely closed and targeted specific kinds of foreign capitals. 
Figure 3 – Composition of Foreign Liabilities, 1991-2015














































Source: Adapted by the authors from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018).
Figure 4 – Composition of Foreign Stocks, 1991-2015











































































Source: Adapted by the authors from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018).
Over the years, Brazil’s more passive, dependent engagement to financial global-
ization engendered a cumulative process in which short-term inflows led to currency 
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overvaluation, pressuring the current account balance and enduring the predominance of 
liabilities over assets. In the long run, currency overvaluation harmed exports’ competi-
tiveness and, consequently, the current account balance, increasing the demand for capital 
inflows. In addition, a financial integration led by liabilities, by definition, pressures the 
current account due to the income payments to non-residents. In light of these develop-
ments, China’s capital controls policies served as part of a set of policies that allowed it to 
break with this vicious circle and ultimately increase its national autonomy. This assump-
tion is in line with the arguments in favour of capital controls put forward by authors such 
as Fritz and Prates 2018; Gallagher 2015; Grabel 2017; Kregel 2004; Ocampo 2017; Prates 
and Paula 2018; Souza and Carvalho 2011.
Taken together, China’s and Brazil’s distributions and compositions of foreign assets 
can be linked with the issue of national autonomy. For China, the preponderance of for-
eign assets implies a higher degree of national autonomy and, increasingly, a projection 
of its monetary and financial power abroad (Cohen 2018). In the case of Brazil, the prev-
alence of foreign liabilities implies a lower level of national autonomy, since the country’s 
external balance is more dependent on the expectations of global investors. This is illus-
trated, for instance, by the greater volatility of the Brazilian real to the global financial 
cycle in comparison to the Chinese renminbi (see Figure 5 below).
Figure 5 – Real Effective Exchange Rate and Global Financial Cycle, 1991-2015 



















































































Source: Adapted by the authors from The World Bank (n.d.) and Chicago Board Options Exchange (n.d.).
Note: In the empirical literature, the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is an efficient proxy for the global financial 
cycle (Rey 2015). Lower VIX levels are associated with an expansion of the global financial cycle, while higher 
VIX levels indicate the reverse.
Finally, the relationship between the exchange rate and the global financial cycle 
also serves to reveal the relevance of capital flows to explain the current account balance, 
which can be regarded as an important element of the DEEs national autonomy. Overall, 
there is a link between a stable and undervalued exchange rate and a consistent current 
account surplus (see Figure 6 below) that reduces DEEs dependency for foreign currency. 
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As demonstrated by the Chinese experience, capital controls contributed to maintain an 
undervalued exchange rate, which in turn contributed to China’s current account sur-
pluses. In contrast, the focus of Brazilian capital control policies on financial stability was 
conversely ineffective in terms of insulating its currency from the global financial cycle, a 
result that was reflected in a correspondingly erratic current account balance, at least until 
2020. In other words, Brazil has left to the market the determination of one of the most 
important macroeconomic prices: the exchange rate. 
Figure 6 – Real Effective Exchange Rate and Current Account Balance, 1991-2015





















































Source: Created by the authors based on The World Bank (2020).
Final remarks
This paper discussed how the new mainstream position on capital account regulation af-
fects the national autonomy of DEEs. It explained the NWE’s view on capital controls as 
a case of embedded neoliberalism, given that it accepts to mitigate financial instability 
while capital account liberalization remains an ultimate policy goal. It argued that capital 
mobility should be understood as a structural feature of the IMFS that, in turn, reproduces 
centre and periphery dynamics in monetary and financial relations in the absence of a 
truly international currency. This hierarchical understanding of the IMFS supported the 
argument of why DEEs become more vulnerable in an almost free capital mobility world 
and why capital controls should be a permanent component of their macroeconomic tool-
kit. Since the NWE’s does not support that conclusion, this paper argued that the policy 
prescriptions drawn from the NWE do not imply in a higher level of national autonomy 
in the case of DEEs.
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This theoretical argument was illustrated with the experiences of China and Brazil. 
This paper argued that, while DEEs start off from an unprivileged position in the interna-
tional system –  including in its monetary and financial spheres –, they hold some degree 
of agency in deciding how to engage with the financial globalization process. Overall, 
China has subordinated its capital controls policies to its national development project, 
while Brazil has enjoyed the pros and cons of being a financially more open economy, 
targeting its capital controls to deal with the financial instability issue. The comparative 
analysis conducted hereby served to shed light on the long-term results engendered by 
each specific strategy. Brazil’s external balance sheet is largely subject to the vulnerability 
to the global financial cycle, increasing the external constraint to reach its domestic policy 
objectives. China’s foreign stocks, in contrast, are more autonomous from external vari-
ables, meaning that it faces a lower external constraint to pursue its domestic policy ob-
jectives. Even so, the greater volatility that China has been facing in response to its gradual 
financial opening is a reminder of the inherent instability of the current IMFS and of the 
place reserved for DEEs within that system.
Notes
1 Andrews (1994: 212-213) has highlighted this point in the context of Germany and other members of the 
European Monetary System.
2 To an extent, the GFC catalysed a tension that was already in place before the Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt in September 2008. Authors such as Levitt (2006: 170) somewhat anticipated the new equilibrium 
that would unfold after the GFC, most specifically, that ‘The globalization project requires a peaceful and 
stable international political order […] the continued liberalization of international economic relations is 
problematic.’
3 In contrast to the New Welfare Economics, the Post-Keynesian tradition proposes a deep reform of the 
IMFS based on the Keynes Plan, encompassing cross-border financial regulations for both capital exporters 
and importers, sharing the cost of the external adjustment between surplus and deficit countries and 
reducing the dollar dominance (Akyüz 2017; Davidson 2017).
4 The interplays between politics and financial policy is by no means an exclusive feature of DEEs. Dagher 
(2018), for instance, has extensively analysed the symbiotic relationship among politicians, financiers, 
bankers and large companies to explain procyclical financial regulation by revisiting the context of ten 
financial crises, nine of which in the context of advanced economies (see, in particular, pages 52-57). On 
the role played by policy elites in decision-making, see Cohen (2018: 9). On the specific case of Chinese 
elites, see Vermeiren and Dierckx (2012). On the case of Brazil, see, for instance, Armijo (1993: 270-271).
5 Andrews (1994) notes that capital mobility can be understood as the outcome not only of policy decisions, 
but also of changes in the world’s technological capacity and in the private sector’s practice. In his words, 
‘changes in the market itself, however, as well as in the technological capabilities of market actors, have 
jointly reduced the impediments to capital movements between states quite independently of the regulatory 
decisions of governments’ (Andrews 1994: 199).
6 This section’s title is inspired by a study by Armijo and Katada (2014: 46-47) on the use of financial statecraft 
by rising powers.
7 This section’s title is inspired by a study by Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2015, 2018) on Brazil’s 
subordinated integration into a financialised and hierarchical SMFI.
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Regulação da Conta Capital e Autonomia Nacional: A 
Economia Política da Nova Economia do Bem-Estar
Resumo: A crise financeira global (GFC) de 2007-2009 corroeu o consenso em 
torno dos benefícios da mobilidade de capital no escopo da economia tradicional. 
Neste contexto, este artigo discute até que ponto a nova posição dominante em me-
didas de gestão de fluxo de capital, com base na Nova Economia do Bem-Estar, ex-
pande o espaço político das economias em desenvolvimento e emergentes (EDEs). 
Este artigo argumenta que a nova posição pode ser classificada como neoliberal 
enraizada, uma vez que mantém a liberalização como objetivo final, embora acei-
te mitigar algumas de suas consequências nefastas. Após comparar as políticas da 
conta capital do Brasil e da China, o artigo conclui que as prescrições de política 
da Nova Economia do Bem-Estar não levam a níveis mais elevados de autonomia 
nacional para as EDEs, sendo também incapazes de conter a instabilidade financeira 
nesses países.
Palavras-chave: mobilidade de capital; controles de capital; Nova Economia do 
Bem-Estar; Economia Política; neoliberalismo enraizado.
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